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Abstract
The early promises of DNA computing to deliver a mas-
sively parallel architecture well-suited to computation-
ally hard problems have so far been largely unkept. In-
deed, it is probably fair to say that only toy problems
have been addressed experimentally. Recent experi-
mental development on algorithmic self-assembly using
DNA tiles seem to offer the most promising path toward
a potentially useful application of the DNA computing
concept. In this paper, we explore new geometries for
algorithmic self-assembly, departing from those previ-
ously described in the literature. This enables us to
carry out mathematical operations like binary multi-
plication or cyclic convolution product. We then show
how to use the latter operation to implement an at-
tack against the well-known public-key crypto system
NTRU.
Keywords: DNA, self-assembly,
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cryptanalysis, NTRU, Wang tiles
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Adleman on the Traveling
Salesman Problem (TSP) [2], DNA computing has re-
ceived a lot of attention both from a theoretical point of
view [6] and from an experimental perspective [10, 7].
By using the DNA molecule as a carrier of non-genetic
information, and biochemistry as a way to process this
information, it is possible to build a massively paral-
lel computing architecture. The implementation details
vary from one experimental approach to another, but
it is certainly fair to describe the overwhelming major-
ity of the reported experiences in the following way:
DNA molecules are used to represent potential solu-
tions and biochemical reactions are used to test whether
these solutions satisfy or not the criteria for being an
actual solution of the problem. Even though a single
biochemical step can take as much as one day to per-
form, the number of solutions tested in parallel is of the
order of the Avogadro number (that is 1023 molecules),
opening interesting computational perspectives. Sev-
eral authors have described how DNA computing could
be used to solve difficult problems like boolean satisfia-
bility [6]. Adleman himself has proposed an application
to crack the DES encryption scheme [1]. DES is a stan-
dard symmetric encryption algorithm with a key of 56
bits, and a few test tubes of DNA would be enough
to carry out a brute force attack on this cipher. Un-
fortunately, these approaches suffer from a number of
drawbacks: (1) they are not always easy to implement
in biochemistry, especially because they require purifi-
cation steps; (2) they rely essentially on brute force
because they do not easily make use of additional in-
formation that might be available about the problem.
The price to pay for massive parallelism is a restricted
flexibility in ”programming” the DNA molecules. For
cryptographic applications, this means that the ”tradi-
tional” approach cannot take advantage of the known
attacks on the weaknesses of a given algorithm.
Mao et al. [8] have recently shown that some de-
gree of flexibility can be introduced in DNA computing
while retaining the intrinsic advantage of massive par-
allelism. For that purpose they used DNA tiles that
are a biochemical implementation of the mathematical
concept of Wang tiles [15]. We will describe these ob-
jects in more detail in Section 2. Suffice it to say for
now that the algorithmic self-assembly of Wang tiles
is Turing Universal and that Mao et al. demonstrated
the experimental feasibility of this concept. We feel
that it is therefore appropriate to investigate in more
detail to what extent the algorithmic self-assembly of
DNA tiles can be used to solve problems that could
not be practically solved using the ”traditional” ap-
proach based on the self-assembly of linear DNA. In
what follows, we demonstrate in particular that binary
multiplication and cyclic convolution product are rela-
tively straightforward to implement (Section 3). Fur-
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thermore, we show that the practical implementation
of our ideas requires the creation of a finite number
of tiles well within the reach of current combinatorial
chemistry. Finally we discuss how our ideas could be
used to implement a cryptanalytic attack on the well-
known public-key crypto system NTRU (Section 4).
2 Algorithmic Self-Assembly
2.1 Wang Tiles
The concept of algorithmic self-assembly is closely re-
lated to that of Wang tiles. Wang showed that square
tiles with colored edges can emulate a Turing machine,
if they are allowed to assemble in a way that would
cover the plane, according to additional rule that edges
of the same color have to face each other [15]. This can
be intuitively understood by thinking of a given row
of tiles as representing a state of the Turing machine
while the color encoding plays the role of the matching
rules. This shows that computing using Wang tiles is
universal [16, 13].
2.2 Physical Implementation of Wang
Tiles
Recent advances in the field of materials science have
enabled the experimental study of algorithmic self-
assembly (abbreviated as ASA in the following). The
first system, studied by Rothemund [12], was made of
tiles whose edges were coated with materials of different
hydrophobicity. The error rate was found to be unac-
ceptably high, even though some expected distinctive
features were observed. We remark that the hydropho-
bic/hydrophilic interaction used in these experiments
was probably not specific enough to enforce proper edge
matching (despite some very clever “ad-hoc” tricks used
by the author). More recently Mao et al. [8] have shown
that nanoscopic tiles can be manufactured using DNA
that are the molecular equivalent of Wang tiles. These
“Triple Crossover” tiles are made of several strands of
DNA interwoven to create a square body made of DNA
double helixes with single (reactive) strands of DNA
sticking out from each edge of the tile. In the fol-
lowing we will refer to those single strands of DNA
as sticky ends because they have the ability to bind
to their Watson-Crick complement. This mechanism
corresponds to the color matching rule in the abstract
Wang tiles system. The experimental investigation fo-
cused on the XOR operation of two binary strings. The
size of the problem was still relatively small, but the
result turned out to be promising, with an error rate
that was less than 2%. Therefore DNA seems to be
the material of choice to implement ASA on a wider
scale. Indeed, materials scientists have achieved a high
degree of control over the nanostructures that can be
built using DNA, and the interaction between single
strands of DNA seems to be specific enough to enable
a self-assembly with an acceptable error rate.
2.3 Our Perspective: Algorithmic Self-
Assembly for Practical Problems
Even though ASA is universal, it does by no means fol-
low that any problem can be practically addressed by
this approach. Indeed, traditional DNA computing is
also universal but, as mentioned above, the quantity
of materials needed to perform a calculation prevents
it to be used for anything but toy problems. Why is
there any reason to believe ASA is a more interesting
approach? The answer lies in the fact that DNA tiles
can be more easily “programmed” to incorporate the
constraints of a given problem. It is therefore possible
to exercise some degree of control over the biochemical
reaction occurring in the test tubes, thus avoiding the
considerable waste of materials that characterize the
traditional approach. Given the recent experimental
developments mentioned above, we believe it is timely
to reflect on the best use that could be made of ASA
for practical purposes. Our approach is resolutely con-
structive: we try to provide examples where ASA turns
out to be a practical way of solving otherwise difficult
problems. This means that we have to depart from
the only geometry that has been studied so far (square
with four sticky ends). We give examples where a bigger
number of sticky ends or a self-assembly not constrained
to proceed in a plane turn out to be advantageous. To
use a very bold analogy, this is reminiscent of the com-
mon situation in traditional computer science where a
problem is straightforward to program in a given lan-
guage (say C) while it is hard to address in another one
(say assembly) 1.
3 Mathematical Operations in
DNA
In this section we describe how to perform mathemati-
cal operations in DNA for two examples. First we show
how to execute a multiplication in 2D. Then we intro-
duce a method to carry out ASA in three dimensions
to execute a cyclic convolution product. We give an
abstract overview of each operation, and then go more
into details. Note that we did not do any practical ex-
periments.
1The analogy breaks down pretty quickly as one tries to give
it a more formal shape, but we hope it is still useful to carry our
message.
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3.1 Multiplication
We implement the schoolbook method as shown in Fig-
ure 1. As example we use a multiplication of two 3-bit
numbers. The binary input is given as vectors a and b
with result r as sum of the corresponding rows under
respect of carry overs. The spatial layout of the DNA
after self-assembly is very similar to that of electronic
circuits carrying out the same function [9].
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Figure 1: Multiplication schoolbook method.
Figure 2 depicts the basic DNA tiles that are needed.
Tile (1) is used for the actual execution. The original
binary operand values are represented by a and b while
s and c represent the intermediate sum and carry over,
respectively. The result of this elementary operation,
intermediate value and carry over, are denoted by s′
and c′. It follows that
c′ = (ab + c+ s)/2, s′ = (ab+ c+ s) mod 2
where integer division is used. There are 16 different
input values determining the number of different tiles
of this kind. Tiles (2) and (5) are used to represent
operand bits. The connection to the next and previous
input tile is denoted by j, while the final result of a
column is connected at r. Tile (3) represents a result
bit which will connect to the sticky end r of input tile
(5) and the sum s′ of tile (1). Furthermore we use frame
tiles to limit the physical expansion of the execution.
Frame tile (4) forwards the carry over value c to the
next left column. Further auxiliary tiles are used (start
and end).
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Figure 2: DNA tiles for multiplication.
Figure 3 shows the arrangement of the DNA tiles to
perform a multiplication. Note that we pad the second
operand b with 0-bits to make reading of the result eas-
ier, and that the result tile connected to b0 is not part
of the result. The body tiles are denoted by vi,j , input
tiles as ai and bj respective, and frame tiles by F . Ex-
tra tiles are needed as starting and end point, denoted
as S and E. We understand that different kind of tiles
need different sticky ends to avoid ambiguity. However,
there are enough combinations available [4]. It is clear
that this method can be applied to bigger operands,
and that it does not require the operands to have the
same length.
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Figure 3: Multiplication in DNA.
So far we have assumed that linear assemblies of in-
put tiles could be readily obtained. We now outline
the way these inputs are “synthesized”. Given a bi-
nary string of N bits, we need 2N different tiles in-
dexed by their value (0 or 1) and their position within
the string (the DNA sequence connecting one digit to
the next one is of course unique for each pair of value
and position). Creating a given input simply consists
in picking out N such tiles with different indices. Note
that, given the appropriate supply, if all the 2N tiles
are mixed together it is possible to obtain the 2N possi-
ble binary strings in a combinatorial fashion. By using
non-identical concentrations for the two possible val-
ues at a given position, it is also possible to induce a
probability distribution on the input strings. All in all,
prior to any calculation involving two strings of length
m and n, we need to synthesize sets of m+ n different
input tiles2, 16 body tiles, 4 + 2 frame tiles, 2 result
tiles, 3 end tiles, and 1 starting tile. Once the input
strings have been synthesized our scheme requires only
one reaction step. All the basic types of tiles are mixed
together and the self-assembly can proceed. Reading
the final result could be done using the reporter strand
technique described in [8]. We note that in our case the
2Note that combinatorial a and b requires B(m+n) tile classes
where B is the base of a and b, i.e., 2(m + n) for binary repre-
sentation.
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reporter strand would have to run through the entire
2D lattice. Alternatively, one could imagine that each
result tile would have a sticky end running perpendicu-
lar to the plane of self-assembly. This would allow the
formation of a linear self-assembled structure above this
plane, that could be used to produce a reporter strand
whose size would scale linearly with the size of the solu-
tion3. Thus, even in the worst case, our multiplication
scheme requires only two reaction steps and the num-
ber of different tiles required is growing linearly with
the size of the problem.
3.2 Cyclic Convolution Product
After showing an example of ASA using relatively com-
plex tiles to produce a straightforward 2D self-assembly,
we now introduce an operation which can be performed
more conveniently in 3 dimensions. First we define the
cyclic convolution product. Let F =
∑N−1
i=0 Fix
i =
[F0, . . . , FN−1] be a polynomial or a vector of length N .
Then the cyclic convolution product ⋆ of two vectors of
length N is defined as [5]:
A ⋆ B = C with
Ck =
k∑
i=0
AiBk−i +
N−1∑
i=k+1
AiBN+k−i
=
∑
i+j≡k mod N
AiBj
The ⋆ multiplication modulo q means that the coef-
ficients Ck are reduced by q. From now on we will
focus on the modulo product. Figure 4 gives a geomet-
rical description of the convolution product. The input
operands are the vectors a and b. The x and y axis de-
scribe the index of the operand bits. The figure shows
the index k of ck to which aibj contributes. By repeat-
ing the input vector a the result coefficient ck can easily
be obtained by adding the diagonal elements.
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Figure 4: Geometrical description of convolution prod-
uct.
3Note that the first “dummy” result tile comes in handy as a
PCR primer.
We execute the convolution product in DNA accord-
ing to the geometry just outlined. First we assemble the
elementary multiplications in a “ground layer”, then we
grow the crystal to the third dimension to obtain the
result. Figure 5 describes the body tile of the ground
layer. It has two input ends a and b, forwards the input
to the opposite side, and outputs the value ab using a
sticky end pointing in the direction perpendicular to the
plane of self-assembly 4. Figure 6 shows how the ground
layer is built. Again we use input tiles, frame tiles, and
start and end tiles. Note that the first operand a is
fixed since it has to be repeated.
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Figure 5: Body tile for convolution product.
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Figure 6: Cyclic convolution product in DNA.
To add the coefficients, we use bridges which are as-
sembled for each layer beforehand. The implementa-
tion of the bridges ensures that the result coefficients
4It is depicted as a circle in Figure 5.
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are modulo reduced. The bridges are built using con-
nectors to the lower layer, a connector to the next layer,
and spacer tiles5. Bridges broken down into their con-
stitutive tiles are shown in Figure 7.
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c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1st layer
2nd layer
Figure 7: Bridge to add the coefficients.
The three dimensional arrangement of the bridges is
shown in Figure 8. The bridges are arranged on top of
the ground layer as outlined in Figure 6. The dark
grey connections represent bridge connections in the
first layer, while the light grey connections stand for
second layer bridges.
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Figure 8: Bridges in the 3D space (connections in the
ground layer are not pictured for simplification).
To simplify the bridge building operation we assume
that the operands have a length which is a power of 2.
To force the bridges to operate along the appropriate
diagonal, it would be necessary to use a 2D lattice with
a lower symmetry than the square symmetry used for
convenience in Figure 6 6. The result of the operation
can now be read at the sticky ends of the uppermost
layer. The coefficient CN−1 appears twice and has to be
ignored once. The diagonals which we do not consider
will not assemble up to the highest layer.
5whose number depends on the layer under consideration
6To prevent that bridges are attached to the wrong tiles such
that at some sticky ends there is no bridge attached at all one
could use input tiles for a with alternate length in between.
Note that input coefficients are integers instead of bi-
naries. Therefore the number of tiles needed is much
larger than for the multiplication. Let ai ∈ {0, . . . , s−
1} and bj ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}. Synthesis of the input tiles
requires 2N + N tile classes. Fixed a and combina-
torial b requires 2N + tN tile classes though. Includ-
ing start, end, frame, input, and body tiles we need
1+3+4+2N+N+st = 8+3N+st tile classes for the
first layer. Remember that the bridge tiles perform ad-
dition modulo q. Therefore we need q2 different bridge
combinations, i.e., q2 connector tiles to the upper layer
and 2q connectors to the lower layer. Furthermore we
need spacer tiles to build the bridges. Assuming that q
is considerably larger than s and t the number of dif-
ferent tiles is in the order of q2 even for combinatorial
b. If N = 2x then our structure will consist of x + 1
layers including the ground layer. Each layer will be
grown one at at time, using bridges with the appropri-
ate spacing. The final result will therefore be obtained
in x+ 1 steps.
3.3 More Practical Considerations
The first problem that needs to be addressed is that of
the error rate during a computation. Theoretical con-
siderations taking into account the thermodynamics of
the system are clearly outside of the scope of this paper,
and we will therefore only lead a qualitative discussion.
The process of self-assembly within a plane, that we use
for our multiplication scheme and as the first step in our
cyclic convolution product, is in essence very similar to
the construction of Mao et al. for their XOR product. It
is therefore likely that an experimental error rate below
2% could be expected. Much higher error rates could
be expected for the building of the successive layers in
our convolution product because cooperativity is much
lower in this direction (the number of neighbors is much
lower which means less constraints). This would prob-
ably require the interaction energies between the sticky
ends in this direction to be relatively high, in order to
give a maximum energetic penalty to possible “orphan”
sticky ends.
Any reader familiar with materials science will prob-
ably already have more than a few objections to our
claims. Indeed, we must acknowledge that, to date, no
DNA tile has been synthesized that could be used to
implement our schemes directly. To what extent this
will be true in the future is of course absolutely im-
possible to tell. We will simply refer the reader to the
recent work accomplished by the group of Seeman [11]
on the creation of DNA-based nanostructures and let
him decide for himself how far experimental science is
from being able to implement our ideas. We do not
believe that our computation schemes alone would be
enough to motivate the considerable experimental work
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required to investigate the 3D ASA of DNA. But we
should note that this technique is also very promising
for the much more researched problem of protein crys-
tallization. It is therefore not completely utopic to ex-
pect experimental progress on that front. Also, even
though the total number of different types of tiles to be
synthesized is not overwhelming and certainly within
the reach of combinatorial chemistry techniques, even
for operations on binary numbers of a few hundred bits,
it remains to be seen which incentive an experimental-
ist could have to perform such an experiment. That’s
why we devote the next section of this article to show
that it might be possible to implement an attack on a
strong public-key crypto system using our strategy for
the cyclic convolution product.
4 Application to Cryptography
In the mid 90’s it was shown that DNA computing can
be applied to break DES [3, 1]. These methods are
based on a brute force attack. Using the parallel na-
ture of DNA computing all possible keys are tested. For
symmetric encryption ciphers like DES a brute force
attack often is the only practical attack due to lim-
ited knowledge. However, for public-key methods brute
force attacks are usually far out of computing power
range because the key length is chosen according to the
best known attack. which requires much less effort than
brute force. DNA attacks are limited by the complexity
of an attack step and the amount of DNA. In the fol-
lowing we will present the public-key system NTRU and
a simple brute force attack in DNA. Then we present
the execution of an attack on NTRU which reduces the
amount of DNA by the square root. DNA tiles provide
the appropriate flexibility to implement both attacks.
4.1 Overview of NTRU
4.1.1 Notation
In this section we will give a brief overview of NTRU.
For further details see [5]. The NTRU system is based
on a ring R = Z/(XN − 1) , three integers (N, p, q) and
four sets Lf ,Lg,Lφ,Lm of polynomials of degree N − 1
with integer coefficients. We assume that gcd(p, q) = 1,
and that q is considerably larger than p. Elements F ∈
R are written as a polynomial or vector
F =
N−1∑
i=0
Fix
i = [F0, F1, . . . , FN−1]
Multiplication in R is done using the cyclic convolu-
tion product ⋆ as defined in Section 3.2. Multiplication
modulo q means that the coefficients of the convolution
product are reduced modulo q.
4.1.2 Key Creation
Assume two entities called Bob and Alice who want to
exchange messages over an insecure channel. First Bob
chooses elements f ∈ Lf and g ∈ Lg. For simplicity
we assume that f has coefficients in {0, 1} and that
g has coefficients in {0, ldots, s − 1}. The polynomial
f is chosen such that it has exactly d coefficients of
value 1 and N−d coefficients of value 0. Bob computes
f−1q ≡ f−1 mod q and h ≡ f−1q ⋆g mod q. Bob’s private
key is the polynomial f and his public key is h.
4.1.3 Encryption
To encrypt a plain text message m ∈ Lm using Bob’s
public key h, Alice selects a random element r ∈ Lφ
and computes the cipher text e ≡ (r ⋆ h+m) mod q.
4.1.4 Decryption
To decrypt the cipher text e using the private key f ,
Bob first computes a ≡ f ⋆e mod q where he chooses the
coefficients of a in the interval from −q/2 to q/2. Now
Bob recovers the plain text message as m ≡ (f−1 mod
p) ⋆ a mod q.
4.2 Brute Force Attack
The goal of the attack is given all parameters (N, p, q),
the sets Lf ,Lg,Lφ,Lm, and a public key h to recover
the private key f . Let us assume that polynomials in
Lg have coefficients in {0, . . . , s − 1}. As before any
f ∈ Lf has d coefficients of value 1 andN−d coefficients
of value 0. An attacker can recover the private key by
trying all possible f ∈ Lf and testing if g′ = f ⋆h mod q
has small entries, i.e., if the coefficients are between 0
and s − 1. Similarly, an attacker can try all g ∈ Lg
and test if f ′ = g ⋆ h−1 mod q has only coefficients 0 or
1. In practice, Lg is smaller than Lf , so the security is
determined by the number of elements in Lg.
The attack can be implemented in DNA as follows.
For all g ∈ Lg compute the cyclic convolution product
g ⋆ h−1 mod q as explained in Section 3.2. Choose h−1
as the operand which is repeated. Use the massive par-
allelism of DNA to compute the convolution product of
h−1 with all the possible g. Reading of the operation
result is done by the reporter strand method. Among
all the results, the one consisting only of 0 or 1 7 is the
private key. To get it we need to run q − 2 separation
steps.
This attack does not scale up well. It is limited by
q which determines the number of different tiles. A
typical value for q is 64 or 128 [5] which means that
more than 4,000 different tile classes are needed. An-
other restriction is given by the total amount of DNA.
7Remember that each digit of the result can take q values.
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The number of DNA tiles to be used in the compu-
tation cannot be expected to be much more than the
Avogadro number (about 1023). Therefore this kind of
attack is roughly limited to 280 different possibilities for
g. Since the coefficients of g are not limited to binary
values there can be 280 different possible polynomials
of length 64. Usually the key space is defined as the
set of possible keys. In our case we extend the defini-
tion such that the key space is the set which is used
for an attack, i.e., for NTRU this is usually Lg since it
is smaller than Lf . The key security is defined as the
number of steps, or in our case different inputs, that
have to be performed or tried before the key is found
using the best known attack. The best known attack is
shown in the next section and reduces the effort by a
square factor, i.e., the key security is the square root of
the number of elements in the key space. Thus we can
break an NTRU system having a key security of 240 for
a proper value s. However, a typical key security for
NTRU in high security scenarios is about 280, i.e., Lg
has 2160 elements. In the next section we give a future
perspective how this can be achieved.
4.3 Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
The meet-in-the-middle attack reduces the effort to find
the private key. Compared to a brute force attack this
attack reduces the amount of DNA which is required
for a successful attack by the square root, or in other
words the key space which can be broken is quadratic
in size. We will give a brief overview of the attack.
Detailed information is given in [14]. Remember that
the private key f has exactly d ones and N − d zeros.
The idea of the attack is to search for f in the form
(f1, f2) where f1 and f2 each have d/2 ones and are
N/2 in length. Then try all possibilities for f1 and f2
such that (f1, f2) ⋆ h mod q has coefficients between 0
and s− 1. This can be done efficiently as follows.
Choose at random N/2 of the N possible positions in
f . Assume that d/2 of these N/2 positions have ones
in the actual private key f . The probability that this
assumption holds is approximately 1 to
√
d, so the fol-
lowing has to be repeated around
√
d times before f
is found. Now relabel the positions such that the cho-
sen N/2 positions determine the vector f1 and the other
N/2 positions f2. The next step is to enumerate over f1.
Usually this takes only
(N/2
d/2
)
steps but in DNA we prob-
ably have to iterate over all 2N/2 binary vectors. Since
d is chosen such that the key space is very large the
relative difference is very small. First (f1, 0) ⋆ h mod q
is computed and put into a bin based on its first k co-
efficients. If the convolution product has coefficients
F0, . . . , Fk−1 then it is put into a bin (Ij0 , . . . , Ijk−1 )
where Iji ⊃ Fi are integer intervals. The size of the
intervals are determined by k. Then all possible val-
ues for f2 are enumerated. The convolution product
−(0, f2)⋆h mod q is put into a bin (Jj0 , . . . , Jjk−1) that
is defined by intervals that are slightly larger as the
previous ones (each bin is exactly by s-1 larger). Fi-
nally the bins are compared. If the assumption about
the position of the ones in f in the first step was right
then there is a matching pair f1 and f2 such that f1
is in (Ij0 , . . . , Ijk−1 ) and f2 in (Jj0 , . . . , Jjk−1), and the
private key can be derived as f = (f1, f2).
In DNA the attack is executed as follows. First
choose N/2 random positions in f . The marked po-
sitions are represented by f1 which is assembled using
DNA tiles such that the marked positions are chosen
combinatorial and the unmarked positions are set to
0. This can easily be done by encoding the position
into the DNA tiles that represent f1 as described be-
fore. Execute (f1, 0) ⋆ h mod q in parallel for all possi-
ble combinations of f1 as explained in Section 3.2. The
polynomial h is the fixed operand which is repeated.
Now construct DNA tiles for f2 in the same manner
as before but set marked bits to 0 and iterate over un-
marked bits, and execute −(0, f2) ⋆ h mod q. To put a
product into a bin we use special DNA tiles with two
sticky ends that translate an integer value into the cor-
responding interval. These tiles are different for the
two convolution products in the sense that the interval
sizes are different. Tiles for the first convolution prod-
uct can connect to tiles for the second product with the
same intervals, i.e., tiles representing Iji will be glued
to tiles representing Jji . Apply these tiles to the con-
volution products. Assuming that the mobility of the
DNA supra molecular assemblies is not too small, two
of them will stick together. If such a tandem struc-
ture can be found the original assumption was right,
and the private key can be determined by reading the
input tiles f1 and f2. The actual reading stage is prob-
lematic here, as the reporter strand method likely does
not seem to work. We suggest another approach where
the DNA structures are first filtered according to their
molecular weight, and those corresponding to tandem
units are examined by atomic force microscopy8.
Assuming that a brute force attack can be mounted
to break a key security of 240 the described meet-in-
the-middle attack in DNA might break systems with
a key security of 280. However, many assumptions are
very optimistic for the near future. Furthermore we
understand that using a higher security level, e.g., a
key security of 2285 as proposed in [5] puts public-key
systems like NTRU far out of range for a successful
cryptanalysis in DNA.
8If the recent developments in coupled NMR and AFM become
mainstream, then reading could be done by coordinating atoms
with very different resonance frequencies to the input tiles.
7
5 Conclusions
We have presented two computation schemes for the
binary multiplication and cyclic convolution product
using the algorithmic self-assembly of DNA tiles. For
that purpose, we introduced new conceptual designs for
DNA tiles that should allow for a practical implementa-
tion of these operations. Indeed, we emphasize the fact
that even though DNA tiles are by themselves universal,
tiles with different designs will perform very differently
on a given problem: designing effective DNA tiles for a
given computation can be thought as “DNA program-
ming”. The most interesting feature of our system of
DNA tiles is that it turns out to be flexible enough to
go beyond a simple brute force algorithm: it would in-
deed be possible to use it to implement an attack on a
public-key crypto system. Among the open questions,
we have to acknowledge that we do not have any esti-
mations on the expected error rate. We are currently
trying to address this issue.
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